

# (In)definiteness in natural languages

Day 3

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## A note on demonstratives

Elbourne (2008) argues that demonstratives are essentially definite DPs:

- They introduce the existential and uniqueness presuppositions.
- They have anaphoric uses.

Special properties:

- Ostension: Demonstrative DPs often rely on ostension/extralinguistic deixis for their reference, as in e.g.(1a). There are interesting cases of “deferred ostension”.

- (1) a. that dog [pointing at a dog]  
b. That dog [pointing at an empty kennel ] is just outside of its kennel, but this dog [pointing at another empty kennel] is very lazy.

## A note on demonstratives

Elbourne's analysis: Demonstrative NPs have two additional arguments on top of ordinary definite NPs: an index (an individual variable), and a relational variable that determines the relation between the index (what is being pointed at) and the referent of the NP. The denotation below is a simplification.

$$(2) \quad \llbracket \textit{this} \rrbracket = \lambda P. \lambda x. \lambda R. \iota y. P(y) \& R(x, y)$$

$$(3) \quad \llbracket \textit{this dog}[\textit{pointing at a kennel}] \rrbracket = \iota y. y \textit{ is a dog and } y \textit{ lives in the kennel that I'm pointing at}$$

- Proximity/distality

Macedonian: *ovoj* (proximal), *toj* (medial), *onoj* (distal)

# An alternative to the theory of uniqueness

- Familiarity approach
- Christophersen (1939): “Now the speaker must always be supposed to know which individual he is thinking of; the interesting thing is that the *the*-form supposes that the hearer knows it too.”
- A major boost to this approach: Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982)
- ▶ Essentially the same idea
- ▶ Certain NPs introduce entities which can be discourse relevant (i.e. they can be referred to in the subsequent discourse)
- ▶ Certain NPs introduce *discourse referents*.

## Definiteness and indefiniteness: Heim 1982

- The difference between a definite and an indefinite NP in mini-discourses like (4) is explained as follows:

(4) A woman sat with a cat on her lap. She stroked the cat and it purred.

- Indefinite NPs: introduce new entities into the discourse.
- Definite NPs: refer to existing discourse entities.
- Both indefinite and definite NPs are non quantificational
  - their meaning is a variable + descriptive content

# Definiteness and indefiniteness: Heim 1982

- Discourse: building up a file (metaphor)
  - The variables are indices on file cards representing discourse entities
  - Indefinite NPs: introduce a new variable (“starting a new card”)
  - Definite NPs: look for an existing variable (“updating a suitable old card”)
    - The descriptive content of the definite NP has to be compatible with the already existing information about the correspondent discourse referent
    - Fully compatible with the presupposition of existence.

# Definiteness and indefiniteness: Heim 1982

## Difficult cases

- (5) Harold bought the/#a first house he looked at.
- (6) The instructor assigned the/#some most difficult exercises she could find.
- (7) In her talk, Baldwin introduced the/#a notion that syntactic structure is derivable from pragmatic principles.
- (8) What's wrong with Bill? Oh, the woman he went out with last night was nasty to him.
- (9) Mary's gone for a spin in the car she just bought.

## Definiteness and indefiniteness: Heim 1982

- To solve problematic cases accommodation is used.
- Heim's proposal: accommodated entities have to be linked with existing discourse referents.
- ▶ Descriptions referring to unique entities constitute a problem for the familiarity approach.



## Insertion: The form of discourse-novel entities in Catalan (experimental)

- Gap-filling: definite or indefinite article.
- We assume that the choice of the form represent the interpretation (from the previous study, definite as unique and indefinite as non-unique).
- The NP in question is discourse-novel; a sentence-initial subjects. It may or may not be uniquely identified in the given contexts.
- Discourse context-referent pairs were labeled as follows: *popular blog – author; local shopping centre – guard; school trip – teacher; butchery – butcher; office – manager; private company – programmer; ambulance – nurse*


## Insertion: The form of discourse-novel entities in Catalan (experimental)

Example item:

- (10) En aquesta empresa privada, els deutes salarials van començar a augmentar i els treballadors van començar a anar-se'n. \_\_\_ informàtica se'n va anar fa un any i mig. El director general li devia 47.000 euros.

'In this private company the salary debts started to grow, and the workers started to leave. \_\_\_ programmer left a year and a half ago. The CEO owed her 47,000 euros.'

# Insertion: The form of discourse-novel entities in Catalan (experimental)



## Insertion: The form of discourse-novel entities in Catalan (experimental)

- Clear preference for def. NPs in some contexts (*popular blog - author, local shopping center - guard, school trip - teacher*), while in other contexts def. or indef. article can be used (*private company - programmer, ambulance - nurse*).
- The interpretation of “bare” nominal as unique or non-unique (and the subsequent choice of the article) indeed depends on the context, based on the shared beliefs of discourse participants’ about the situation.
- A discourse-novel NP can be definite. Accommodation: the link to the previous context (bridging).

# Main theories of definiteness

- Uniqueness (Frege, 1892; Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950, i.a.): exactly one individual satisfying the descriptive content of the NP  
For plurals: inclusiveness/maximality (Sharvy 1980, Link 1983)  
 $\iota/\sigma$ -shift
- Familiarity (Christophersen, 1939; Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982, i.a.), also identifiability: definite article signals that the hearer can identify the referent (due to previous mention, immediate situation, world knowledge...). Familiarity is a particular case of identifiability.
- The two approaches are not mutually exclusive: if the referent is familiar to the speaker and the hearer, it is uniquely identifiable (within a restricted domain).

# Determinacy

- Coppock & Beaver (2015) analyze definiteness into two main components: uniqueness and determinacy.
- Definiteness marking is seen as a morphological category that triggers a uniqueness presupposition, while determinacy consists in referring to an individual (i.e. having a type  $e$  denotation).
- Definite descriptions typically receive determinate interpretations, but they can be interpreted indeterminately as well!

# Indefiniteness

## Definites vs. indefinites

(11) I just heard the dog bark.

(12) I just heard a dog bark.

What is the difference?



# Indefinites. Distribution

## Indefinites vs. quantifiers

- Predicative use

(13) Milou is a nice dog.

(14) \*Milou is every dog I've loved.

- Existential constructions

(15) There was a/one book on the table.

(16) \*There was each book on the table.

## Indefinites. Distribution

### Unmarked vs. marked indefinites

- Argument position. Existential interpretation

- (17)
- A dog is barking outside.
  - Some dog is barking outside.
  - A certain dog is barking outside.

- Argument position. Generic interpretation

- (18)
- A dog is faithful.
  - \*Some dog is faithful.
  - \*A certain dog is faithful.

# Main characteristics of indefinites

- Scopal ambiguities of *a/some*

(19) Every tourist read a/some guidebook.

a. every  $>$  a/some

b. a/some  $>$  every

(20) Peter wants to marry a Norwegian...

a. so he is going to move to Norway.

b. and she's really beautiful.

# Main characteristics of indefinites

- Long distance scope
- ▶ Normally, quantifiers cannot scope out of islands (e.g., relative clauses):

(21) Mary read a book that every teacher had praised.

only a  $>$  every

- ▶ Indefinite quantifiers, however, seem to be able to have a so-called 'long distance scope':

(22) Mary read every book that some/a teacher had praised.

inverse scope possible

# Main characteristics of indefinites

- Discourse anaphora
  - ▶ Some indefinites introduce discourse referents, whereas the others do not (Karttunen 1976):
- (23) a. I owned a car. It was a Ferrari.  
b. I needed a car. \*It was a Ferrari.

## Some theoretical approaches

- Montague (1974)'s tradition; Barwise & Cooper (1981)
- Indefinites are treated as generalized quantifiers (type  $\langle\langle e, t \rangle t \rangle$ )

- (24)
- a. A dog barked.
  - b. there is a thing  $x$  such that it is a dog and it barked
  - c.  $\exists x(\text{DOG}(x) \ \& \ \text{BARKED}(x))$

# Donkey anaphora problem

(25) Any man who owns a donkey beats it.

- 'a donkey' is indefinite
- should be formally represented like an indefinite in (24).
- But the problem is...

## Donkey anaphora problem

- Donkey anaphora

(26) a. Any man who owns a donkey beats it.

b.  $\forall x [\text{MAN}(x) \ \& \ \exists y [\text{DONKEY}(y) \ \& \ \text{OWN}(x, y)] \rightarrow \text{BEAT}(x, y)]$

The variable  $y$  is left free in the predicate  $\text{BEAT}(x, y)$

- A pre-Heim solution

(27)  $\forall x \forall y [[\text{MAN}(x) \ \& \ \text{DONKEY}(y) \ \& \ \text{OWN}(x, y)] \rightarrow \text{BEAT}(x, y)]$

- ▶ An indefinite is represented as the universal quantifier, which suggests an ambiguity in the interpretation of indefinites.
- ▶ It's intuitively incorrect.



## Some theoretical approaches

- Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) departed from the logical tradition of treating indefinites as quantifiers. They treat them as individual variables. The quantificational force of indefinites is not intrinsic them.

### Donkey sentences

- 'a donkey' refers to any individual having the property of being a donkey, i.e., a random individual is extracted from the set of donkeys.
- The quantificational force of the individual variable 'donkey(x)' is contributed by some element of the context.
- The universal force observed in (26a) is due to the quantified NP 'every man', which binds both *a donkey* and the anaphoric pronoun *it*, which is coindexed with *a donkey*.

## Some theoretical approaches

- A choice function approach
  - A choice function maps any non-empty set onto an element of that set. It is a function of type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, e \rangle$ , which applies to the property denoted by the nominal predicate (of type  $\langle e, t \rangle$ ) and yields an individual (of type  $e$ ) that has that property.
    - ▶ Only choice function indefinites (Winter 1997)
    - ▶ Choice function and quantification indefinites (Reinhart 1997)
  - The contribution of the indefinite is to introduce a variable over choice functions that gets bound by existential closure, which may apply at various points of the representation. (Examples from Dobrovie-Sorin & Beyssade 2012)
- (28)
- a. A student is absent.
  - b.  $\exists f(\text{be-absent}(f(\text{student})))$
  - c. There exists a choice function and the student that this function chooses is absent.

## Some theoretical approaches

- Scope ambiguities represented in the choice function approach.

(29) Every woman read a book.

- a.  $\exists f [\forall x (\text{woman}(x) \rightarrow \text{read}(x, f(\text{book})))]$
- b.  $\forall x [\text{woman}(x) \rightarrow \exists f (\text{read}(x, f(\text{book})))]$

Traditional approach (the relative position of the quantifiers accounts for the difference in the interpretation)

- (30)
- a.  $\exists x \forall y (\text{woman}(y) \rightarrow (\text{book}(x) \& \text{read}(y,x)))$
  - b.  $\forall y \exists x (\text{woman}(y) \rightarrow (\text{book}(x) \& \text{read}(y,x)))$

## Some theoretical approaches

- Superiority of choice function approach: when property denoted by the head noun is empty. E.g., in a world where there are no philosophers, (31a) is undefined and (31b) is true (contra the intuition)

(31) Max will be furious if I invite a philosopher.

a.  $\exists f$  [invite(I, f(philosopher))  $\rightarrow$  furious(Max)]

b.  $\exists x$  [(philosopher(x) & invite(I, x))  $\rightarrow$  furious(Max)]

# Summary

The semantic type of indefinites is an open question!